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Introduction: selves and information policy
Julie Cohen’s Configuring the Networked Self1is a book about information policy
in the digital age, but its author is after bigger game. Cohen argues that how we
look at information policy will differ depending on how we imagine the nature
of the self. Throughout the book, Cohen’s foil is a set of assumptions about
selves in contemporary legal theory, sometimes openly stated, sometimes
merely assumed. In this conception, selves are autonomous, independent,
and freely choosing. They consciously compose and follow their life plans
and they make rational decisions based on a more or less stable set of values
and preferences.
Much of the book critiques these and similar assumptions and the way that
they subtly structure debates about information policy. For example, Cohen
argues that theories of copyright and fair use based on romantic authors and
transformative users (or, conversely, on rational maximizers and consumers)
can be misleading because much creative activity is not consciously chosen,
and much creation is done haphazardly, collectively, or through bricolage.2
Similarly she criticizes theories of privacy that view information collection,
use and distribution as inherently connected to the promotion and dissemin-
ation of truth, and that understand individual dignity to require individualized
treatment.3 Information collection may lead to exposure and loss of control
rather than to the promotion of truth. Individualized treatment, rather than
promoting human dignity, may undermine it, for example, through targeted
surveillance or customized search.4
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In place of these assumptions, Cohen wants to offer a portrait of selves that
are continuously constructed by various features of cultural, political, social,
economic, and technological power, selves that are never fully formed, but
constantly evolving, selves that are busily trying out new techniques, practices,
forms of knowledge and even identities.
In Cohen’s portrait, the self is constantly traveling through terrains that
themselves are constantly changing. It finds itself thrown into perplexing new
circumstances, and continually navigating uncertain opportunities, evolving
limits, malleable boundaries, developing conventions, and ever-mutating
forms of power. The relationships between selves and others, and their respect-
ive identities, are negotiated and renegotiated as people move through their
lives. Hence, Cohen offers a vision of the self that is constantly in a process of
becoming, like Heraclitus’s river—always flowing, but never the same. Armed
with this postmodern portrait of the self, Cohen hopes to take on the thorniest
issues in information policy, and in particular, privacy and copyright.
Play and semantic discontinuity
Along with a counter-portrait of selves, Cohen offers a counter-portrait of
freedom. Her two big ideas are the play of everyday practice and semantic
discontinuity.
Play means trying out new things through the practices of everyday life. One
plays not only with objects and conventions, but also with one’s identity and
one’s relationships with others. We should understand selves, Cohen argues, as
situated within changing cultural contexts, technological structures, authoriza-
tions, and forms of power, and changing in response to these changes.
Selves continually engage in play, which involves experimentation, testing,
and revising, not necessarily with a clearly defined goal. Many purposes and
reasons for behavior are emergent, arising out of situations and actions.
People’s identities are not completely stable, but shift as they are placed in
new social contexts, and change over time. Selves constantly evolve, whether by
design or accident. In this way, the play of everyday practice has feedback
effects on self-understanding and identity.
Cohen argues that good information policy should take these features of
human experience into account. Copyright policy should recognize the import-
ance of play in human action. It should leave ample room for experimentation,
mixture, and bricolage, especially with respect to noncommercial uses.
Similarly, privacy policy should recognize that people have multiple identities,
and that their selves are always in the process of being formed. People need
space to experiment and try out new practices and personas. Privacy policy
should permit people to engage in boundary maintenance and to configure and
reconfigure their relationships with others; through this process people’s selves
and their identities will change. In the Internet age, Cohen informs us, human
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freedom means room for maneuver in increasingly intricate systems of infor-
mational control.
Protecting the play of everyday practice may also require special rules for
intermediaries and software platforms that can facilitate and protect play.
Hence, we might offer immunities or safe harbor rules for intermediaries and
platforms not for their own sake but because of their role in fostering the play
of everyday practice.
Cohen’s vision of human freedom emphasizes three key ideas. First, people
must enjoy access to knowledge—meaningful access to informational and cultural
resources—as a requirement of human flourishing. ‘‘Without the raw materials
necessary for social and cultural participation,’’ Cohen argues, ‘‘one cannot
participate meaningfully in the development of culture and community, and
without access to the appropriate networks and tools, one cannot partake of the
resources that the networked information society has to offer.’’5
Second, people must have operational transparency. This means that people
must know how they are situated in code and technologies, what is being done
to them, how code and technology limit their actions and choices and why.6
The third idea, and the most important, is semantic discontinuity: ‘‘gaps and
inconsistencies within systems of meaning and . . . a resulting interstitial com-
plexity that leaves room for the play of everyday practice.’’7 Although Cohen
initially states this idea in terms of meanings, it soon becomes clear that she is
talking about gaps in enforcement and in systems of surveillance and control.
That is because systems of meaning in a networked environment are also sys-
tems of control and surveillance. (Think of collection and collation of personal
data, or digital rights management as examples.) Therefore, ‘‘semantic discon-
tinuity’’ means ‘‘interstitial flexibility within the system of legal rights, institu-
tional arrangements, and associated technical controls.’’8 Semantic
discontinuity means discontinuity in forms of social and technical power. It
‘‘is the opposite of seamlessness: it is a function of interstitial complexity within
the institutional and technical frameworks that define information rights and
obligations and establish protocols for information collection, storage, process-
ing, and exchange.’’9
In the analog world, there are many gaps, flexibilities, and inconsistencies in
social conventions, in the protection of rights, or in law enforcement. The
analog world is a world of pervasive discontinuity and improvisation, even
though we do not always notice it. And when called to our attention, we
may see these aspects of our lives as limitations and imperfections—as bugs
rather than as features. Yet, Cohen insists they may actually be good for us,
5 Id. at 224.
6 Id. at 224, 234–35.
7 Id. at 224.
8 Id. at 234.
9 Id. at 239.
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because they give us space for improvisation and, more generally, freedom. As
we move to an increasingly automated, networked world, these gaps and dis-
continuities may be displaced or eliminated. Governments, businesses, and
other institutions have incentives to build systems that track and collate
more and more forms of potential information and that increasingly use tech-
nology to enforce rules and norms. The gaps, discontinuities, fudges—and
therefore opportunities—that we take for granted in our analog world are
slowly being eliminated in favor of a more precise, regulated, and watched-over
existence. As more and more of our lives either occur on information networks
or are accessible to them, more and more can be known about everyday life,
and systems of control can increasingly pervade everyday life.
This sounds a lot like Michel Foucault’s idea of modern societies as discip-
linary societies, and his notion of power in modern societies existing every-
where. But Cohen’s actual inspiration seems to be the work of Gilles Deleuze
and Felix Guattari, and their idea of ‘‘surveillant assemblages’’—‘‘a heteroge-
neous, linked set of processes and techniques that seeks to harness the raw
power of information by fixing flows of information cognitively and spatially.’’10
What networked citizens need, Cohen, argues, is an ‘‘interstitial complexity
that leaves room for the play of everyday practice. In an increasingly networked
information society, maintaining those gaps requires interventions designed to
counterbalance the forces that seek to close them.’’11
In 1980, Bruce Ackerman dreamed of a ‘‘perfect technology of justice’’ that
would automatically and perfectly secure people’s justified rights.12 In this
conception, injustice arises from imperfect technology, imperfect information,
and imperfect enforcement. Officials may lack correct or sufficient knowledge;
they may have irrational prejudices; resource constraints may cause them to cut
corners, and so on. A perfect technology of justice would eliminate these prob-
lems, maximize knowledge, and secure automatic protection of rights, thus
ensuring just results.
Cohen’s idea of semantic discontinuity begins with the opposite assumption.
We build systems to achieve certain ends, like social order, national security, or
property protection. These systems are a complicated amalgam of practices,
norms, and technologies for identification of law breaking, prosecution, and
punishment. As those practices, norms, and technologies become increasingly
powerful and pervasive, they may do more than protect our rights; they may
actually decrease our practical freedom. An imperfect system of control, rather
than being a hindrance to human liberty, may sometimes be necessary to it,
10 Id. at 137.
11 Id. at 224.
12 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 21 (1980) (‘‘So long as you and I can imagine a
power structure Pi, . . . the perfect technology of justice will costlessly allow us to shape our relations in the way
specified by Pi.’’) The point of such a technology was designed to show how many criticisms of liberalism stem
not from liberalism itself but from our current inability to implement ‘‘the ideal of Neutral dialogue under
imperfect technological conditions.’’ Id. at 22–23.
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even if this means that some laws will go unpunished and some norms will be
only imperfectly realized. Cohen’s argument for ‘‘semantic discontinuity’’ in
networked systems is related to Danielle Citron’s call for ‘‘technological due
process’’ and Jonathan Zittrain’s critique of systems of ‘‘perfect enforcement.’’13
An imperfect system of justice in a realm with a distant king and a limited
state apparatus allows people to move and flee prosecution, change identities,
and start over, even if it sometimes allows some bad actors to violate the law
with impunity. This imperfect system of control offers a kind of freedom, but
through imperfection rather than through the direct protection of rights; in
fact, we might even think of it as a kind of freedom from the increasing per-
fection of rational control. To be sure, semantic discontinuity is not anarchy—
for it exists only in the interstices of larger systems of enforcement, information
collection, and control. Rather, semantic discontinuity refers to pockets or
slivers of imperfection distributed within multiple and interpenetrating systems
of governance and surveillance.
As the forms of surveillance, governance, and control multiply and overlap in
modern societies, the imperfections in these systems become increasingly im-
portant because they preserve gaps or fissures that allow room for maneuver
and space for improvisation. These gaps or fissures do not have to exist purely
by chance; we can accommodate the need for semantic discontinuity through
conscious choice. Indeed, Cohen believes, as we design technological systems
to achieve particular ends—whether they be national security, efficient delivery
of goods and services, or copyright enforcement—we must make sure that
these systems have lacunae, ambiguities, and inconsistencies.
Cohen’s argument, in short, is that instead of designing seamlessness and
perfection into these systems, we should design gaps and incompleteness; or, in
the alternative, we should take advantage of imperfections that are already
present and use them to preserve a space for the play of everyday practice.
In contrast with Ackerman’s dream of a perfect technology of justice, Cohen
dreams of systems that do not cover everything, that work only partly and up
to a point.
Cohen’s advocacy of semantic discontinuity is part of a larger tradition of
thought about the Internet. To a significant degree, left-libertarian celebrations
of the Internet have been premised on a hope that cyberspace might confound
existing systems of authority and control, and that the Internet might offer a
sort of 21st century version of a Biblical city of refuge—a place where the
disaffected could flee, change identities, or indeed, maintain multiple personae.
Liberals and libertarians thus celebrated the Internet as a source of new-found
freedom that might escape existing forms of power and authority while worry-
ing that this freedom would not prove lasting. Indeed, Larry Lessig’s
13 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 1249 (2008); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN,
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET (AND HOW TO STOP IT) 107–23 (2008).
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pessimistic conclusion in one of the earliest works on cyberlaw, Code And Other
Laws of Cyberspace,14 was that governments and private businesses would soon
reestablish control through code, while in their aptly titled book Who Controls
the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World,15 Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu
argued that nation states could and would increasingly establish control over
digital networks in conjunction with private enterprise.
Nevertheless, we must complicate Cohen’s theory of semantic discontinuity
with several caveats. First, semantic discontinuity might be only a second-best
solution to the problem of freedom. Surely one would want at least some rules,
technologies, and practices that directly protected individuals from overreach-
ing by powerful public and private entities. Cohen’s idea of semantic discon-
tinuity responds to the concern that overlapping forms of technological,
economic, social and cultural power will proliferate endlessly, and therefore
we need to preserve gaps and discontinuities in which play can thrive. Put
differently, Cohen’s concept of semantic discontinuity is not a complete ac-
count of human freedom, but simply one aspect of freedom in a networked
world, along with (for example) other values like access to knowledge and
operational transparency.
Second, although I have offered examples taken from criminal law enforce-
ment, Cohen’s idea of semantic discontinuity is about private power as well as
public power. New systems of surveillance and control are being built by gov-
ernments, by corporations, and through systems of public–private cooperation.
In the area of cybersecurity, it is increasingly difficult to separate the public and
private sphere. Data collection presents similar problems: The state often seeks
access to privately compiled and organized databases, while private organiza-
tions collect data both in their capacity as government contractors and as data
brokers for other private organizations.
Both the state and private actors are busily building out systems of preven-
tion, control, and surveillance for various purposes. National security policy
seeks more effective ways of identifying threats and nipping them in the bud.
Advertisers seek better ways of identifying and analyzing their customers and
matching prospective buyers to sellers. Governments seek information about
populations not only to govern them but to deliver valuable social services that
are among the chief benefits of citizenship in the modern state. Content indus-
tries seek better ways of expanding markets, preventing piracy, placing their
goods securely in the hands of paying customers, and finding out more about
how their customers use these goods. What the state and private enterprise
share in common is their quest for perfect technologies—of data collection,
analysis, prevention, security, enforcement, and delivery of services.
14 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
15 JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006).
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A third caveat follows from the second. Cohen’s conception of semantic
discontinuity is necessarily asymmetric. She judges the presence or absence
of semantic discontinuity from the perspective of a particular individual, and
not from the perspective of governments, businesses, or other powerful insti-
tutions. This asymmetry is necessary to ensure that discontinuity helps indi-
viduals rather than hurts them. Some gaps in legal and technological
enforcement might benefit the powerful far more than the powerless.
Governments might take advantage of gaps in civil liberties protections; large
businesses might take advantage of gaps in consumer protection regulations.
Facebook’s ever-shifting privacy policies seem to be a prominent example of a
business taking full advantage of semantic discontinuities wherever it finds
them. But Cohen seeks semantic discontinuity for the benefit of the ordinary
individual and not for the Leviathan state, the national security apparatus, the
multinational corporation, or the malefactor of great wealth.
Although this asymmetry is theoretically necessary to Cohen’s argument, it is
not clear whether she can fully justify or operationalize it. Gaps and ambigu-
ities in code and law that benefit individuals might also benefit powerful cor-
porations, and vice versa. Indeed, sometimes it may not be possible to separate
the two in practice. Think of Google’s current position on fair use as an ex-
ample. YouTube’s business model is premised on incomplete and ineffective
enforcement of copyright infringement. For that matter, so is Google’s entire
enterprise of scraping content from virtually every site on the Web, storing it,
indexing it, and serving up parts of it on demand, all without permission of the
copyright owner. Here Cohen’s notion of semantic discontinuity seems related
to Jonathan Zittrain’s argument for protecting emerging businesses that foster
the generativity of the Internet.16
Many of the businesses and intermediaries on which the play of everyday
practice depends are themselves the beneficiaries of gaps and ambiguities in the
law. It may be difficult if not impossible to create information systems and
policies that offer gaps and ambiguities that individuals can exploit without
also handing the same tools to large private enterprises—who, after all, have
greater access to technical and legal talent to exploit them. Indeed, the problem
with ambiguities in a legal system is that the rich may be able to exploit them
better than the poor; and the problem with gaps is that the powerful may be
able to push through them more easily than the weak. The philosopher
Anacharsis once remarked to the great lawgiver Solon that laws are like spider’s
webs that snare the weak and poor but that the rich and mighty can easily
break through.17
16 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, at 31–33 (arguing for a ‘‘procrastination principle’’ in
Internet design).
17 1 PLUTARCH’S, LIVES 109 (John Dryden trans., Arthur Hugh Clough ed. 2001)
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Semantic discontinuity is ultimately about tradeoffs, and Cohen’s book only
begins the discussion about how those tradeoffs might be accomplished. Even
the metaphor of tradeoffs may be misleading, as it suggests a careful balance of
benefits and risks. But the whole point of gaps and discontinuities in networked
systems is that they offer opportunities for the unexpected, and for unforeseen
transformations of power—including ever new opportunities for exercising
power over others.
How might we apply semantic discontinuity to information policy? In the
context of privacy law, Cohen argues that semantic discontinuity means incom-
plete collection, limits on collation and use, and requirements of data obsoles-
cence and destruction. Not all data are collected, data that are collected are not
fully analyzed, and data that are collected or analyzed are eventually discarded.
With respect to copyright, semantic discontinuity means preserving gaps in
the scope and coverage of copyright law, either deliberately or as a result of
technological innovations. Semantic discontinuity means incomplete coverage,
incomplete protection, and incomplete enforcement. One advantage of older,
technologically outmoded copyright laws like the 1909 Copyright Act, Cohen
argues, is that property rights were often consciously delimited by formal dis-
tinctions and requirements, leaving wide gaps in copyright coverage: ‘‘a legal
regime characterized by formally incomplete rights—by logical gaps that permit
at least some uncontrolled access and use—comes closer to solving the balan-
cing problem that copyright confronts.’’18
Copyright owners might see such gaps either as money left on the table or as
an invitation to piracy and theft. That is why they have repeatedly pressed for
expansion of copyright protection so that it covers every possible use that
copyright owners might someday want to exploit. Cohen, in contrast, sees
some of these limitations as advantages. Gaps in coverage, protection, and
enforcement create opportunities for experimentation by a wide variety of par-
ticipants, especially as technology evolves. ‘‘Creative practice flourishes most
fully under conditions that permit unexpected encounters with new informa-
tion and that provide room for reworking, tinkering, and other forms of cre-
ative play.’’19 Instead of ‘‘broad, all-encompassing statutory provisions and
generous, judicially created tests for infringement,’’ the law should offer ‘‘nar-
rower, clearly delimited formulations of copyright rights separated by deliberate
gaps representing uses that are reserved in the service of cultural play, regard-
less of commercial consequence.’’20 Thus, in Cohen’s view, special copyright
rules for libraries, the first sale doctrine, and fair use itself, should not be
justified as second-best responses to market imperfections that might someday
be eliminated if transaction costs could be sufficiently reduced. Rather, we
18 Cohen, supra note 1 at 246.
19 Id. at 246.
20 Id.
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should understood these rules as desirable gaps in a system of copyright en-
forcement that allow people to gain access to knowledge and play with infor-
mation and culture.21
Play, semantic discontinuity and freedom of expression
Configuring the Networked Self is not specifically about free expression, but the
book nevertheless remains quite relevant to it. Cohen’s argument, after all,
concerns the conditions of cultural freedom in the digital age. Freedom of
speech is a central aspect of cultural freedom, not to mention a central concern
of any systematic account of knowledge and information policy.
Moreover, the central concerns of the book are (i) privacy, (ii) copyright, and
(iii) control over digital networks. Not coincidentally, it turns out that the three
key problems of freedom of speech in the digital age are (i) the relationship
between freedom of expression and privacy, (ii) the relationship between free
expression and copyright, and (iii) control over digital networks (which in-
cludes issues like intermediary liability, filtering, blocking, and throttling
content).
Thus, much of what Cohen says about these issues can also be understood in
terms of free speech values. Limited copyright creates more space for using
cultural resources in expression. Although information privacy is sometimes in
tension with freedom of speech, freedom of conscience and freedom of asso-
ciation often require anonymity or pseudonymity. Moreover, many kinds of
privacy restrictions on data collection and use do not conflict with freedom
of expression at all.22 Digital controls over networks—for example,
government-mandated filtering regimes—clearly raise free speech concerns.
Finally, limits on intermediary liability—like section 230 of the 1996
Telecommunications Act—may not be required by the First Amendment, but
such doctrines clearly implicate free speech values.23
How should we apply Cohen’s ideas of a postmodern self, the play of every-
day practice and semantic discontinuity to the problems of free expression in
the digital age?
At the outset, Cohen’s argument poses a challenge to traditional understand-
ings of free expression. Contemporary free speech law seems to be premised on
the very sort of self that Cohen argues is a fiction. Free speech law generally
ascribes autonomy and independence to individuals in their choices about what
to read or not to read. It assumes that adults generally can decide for them-
selves what expression they wish to encounter. That is why we place
21 Id. at 230–32.
22 For examples, see Neil Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149
(2005).
23 Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 428 (2009).
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responsibility on individuals to decide what to read or not to read, rather than
the state, and that is why we tell individuals that if they dislike certain forms of
expression, they must avoid them or argue against them rather than have the
state censor them. In the words of Justice John Marshall Harlan in Cohen v.
California, if autonomous individuals are offended by speech, they always have
the choice to avert their eyes.24 In contrast, when the law regards individuals as
not autonomous, but as dependent, we allow the state to regulate expression.25
(The classic example is children.) Cohen challenges the opposition between
independence and dependence implicit in free speech doctrine because she
challenges the account of the self on which it is based.
Nevertheless, there has always been another conception of freedom of
speech—equally rooted in the Enlightenment project—that does not make
the same binary assumptions about the autonomy or dependence of the self.
This model assumes that selves are produced in part by the culture and insti-
tutions in which they live. It regards expression and access to knowledge as
crucially important to the flourishing of culturally constructed selves. It argues
that selves develop within a constantly changing culture that these selves, in
turn, contribute to.
This model of free expression is premised on four interlocking ideas.
First, speech is about processes of persuasion—which may appeal to reasons,
emotions, judgments, or values.
Second, the processes of communication result in mutual influence—people
shape each others’ values and opinions through participation in public dis-
course, including not only science and politics, but also art and popular
culture.
Third, a crucial element of free processes of communication is the protection
and accommodation of cultural and political dissent—through which people
object to accepted conventions and social meanings, and to forms of power
and status that affect them and others. Dissenters may challenge conventions as
much as they challenge government officials; they may seek to reform cultural
practices as much as laws; they may contest the power of culture as much as
the power of the state.
Fourth, protection of freedom of speech protects cultural participation—be-
cause it is through participation that people produce, reproduce or alter con-
ventions, understandings, and social practices.
These ideas of persuasion, mutual influence, dissent and cultural participa-
tion make particular sense from the standpoint of Cohen’s portrait of the post-
modern self. Selves are works in progress, borrowing from and copying others,
24 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
25 See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L. J. 151, 163 (1996) (‘‘Ultimately, speech will be assigned
to public discourse on the basis of normative and ascriptive judgments as to whether particular speakers in
particular contexts should constitutionally be regarded as autonomous participants in the ongoing process of
democratic self-governance.’’)
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renegotiating boundaries, following fads or rejecting them, and participating in
cultural practices and conventions.
Moreover, culture is a form of power, perhaps even more pervasive and
universal than political power. This power can be helpful or harmful, and it
can promote human flourishing or undermine it.
Culture creates both problems and opportunities for human flourishing and
human freedom. It both undergirds flourishing and freedom and threatens
them. Culture gives us identities and limits on our identities; it promotes cre-
ativity and hinders our imaginations; it fosters our development and crushes us
under the weight of conventions, genres, norms, and expectations.
If people are constructed in the way that Cohen says they are, how can
people flourish within culture and not merely be subservient to it? How can
people have a say in the forms of social power that constitute them as individ-
uals and that shape the possibilities of their lives? They do this through their
participation in the reproduction of social practices and through variation in
these forms of reproduction. Put differently, people engage with forms of cul-
tural power in part through what Cohen calls ‘‘play.’’
It is important not to overstate the importance of play. Not everyone is a
cultural rebel, and not everyone’s participation or variation in social under-
tstandings or practices is of equal effect. Most people’s effects on culture are
small or occur only at the margins. Yet it is the sum of these acts of cultural
reproduction that keep culture—and cultural power—going over time. And
because these forms of power limit individuals, foster individuals, shape iden-
tities, and create and constrain opportunities for different kinds of lives, the
ability to hold this power to account, to vary it, to reshape its reproduction over
time, is important.
Acts of cultural reproduction and participation in existing conventions always
carry the possibility of their own variation. Jacques Derrida famously
announced that ‘‘interability alters.’’26 The very repetition of the acts, practices
and conventions that keep social meanings alive also creates the potential for
their alteration and evolution. Culture in this sense is both always old and
always new, because it is always being reproduced through individual inter-
actions that are never quite the same as previous ones, and that are always
being placed in new contexts. Some of this variation is unconscious; some is
deliberate. Some is accidental; some is motivated. All of it contributes to cul-
tural evolution over time, for good and for ill.
Therefore, play is important not simply from the perspective of the individ-
ual actor seeking freedom, but also from the perspective of cultural systems
and the various assemblages of cultural power. Systems of cultural power
depend on continual reproduction through the actions, thoughts and expres-
sions of many different individuals in different social roles. The right of free
26 JACQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED, INC. 62 (1988).
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expression gives individuals the ability to say yes, no—or equally importantly,
‘‘yes, but’’—within the practices that reproduce cultural power. Cultures breed
subcultures, ideas go viral, customs mutate, and conventions adapt.
What Cohen calls ‘‘play’’ has both individual and systemic aspects: there is
play as individual experimentation or improvisation and there is play in the
joints of cultural structures. Cultural participation is surely important to the
growth and development of individual human beings; but it may equally be
important from a collective standpoint because of its consequences for the
reproduction of systems of cultural power. The potential for variation through
play, mutual influence, persuasion and dissent creates the possibility of a dif-
ferent culture than the one in which we are now situated, and thus the possi-
bility of different kinds of power and freedom, and thus different kinds of
selves. Such change may bring human flourishing or its opposite, but the
point is that cultural participation creates the opportunity for cultural change.
I have called this idea of individual cultural participation that helps reshape
the culture one lives in ‘‘democratic culture.’’27 Freedom of expression plays an
important role in the promotion of such a culture, although, to be sure, it is
only one aspect of a democratic culture. Free expression gives people a say
about the forms of power that constitute them as individuals, and that, through
cultural reproduction, foster, limit, constrain, and enable them. A democratic
culture is not democratic because people hold a vote on what will be in or out
of culture, but because everyone gets to participate in it, and through partici-
pating in it, they participate in its reproduction, and, equally important, its
variation.
Many theories of free expression are grounded in a narrower conception of
democracy. Their concern is the democratic legitimacy of the state. We should
protect freedom of speech and the formation of public opinion because they
facilitate democratic self-government or because they are necessary to the pol-
itical legitimacy of a democratic state. The theory of democratic culture agrees
that the democratic accountability of the state is important, but views it as part
of a larger concern: providing democratic constraints on power over individuals
generally.
There are many forms of power that affect individuals’ lives beyond the state;
they arise in the realms of morality, sexuality, economics, science, knowledge
production, technological design, ideology, and convention. The fight for gay
rights, for example, was not simply an attempt to change the law, although that
was an important element. It was also an attempt to reshape understandings
about sexuality in morality, in science, and in everyday social interactions; it
was an attempt to reinterpret and reconfigure a wide range of cultural practices
linked to sexuality. Moreover, even if we concern ourselves solely with political
27 Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information
Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005).
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power, many forms of political power exist outside the nation state, in trans-
national social movements and in international politics. And as the example of
the Internet demonstrates, many forms of technological and cultural power
transcend the nation state, even as nation states attempt to control and do-
mesticate them.
To be sure, there is a great deal more to culture than freedom of expression.
And therefore a democratic culture is not guaranteed merely by freedom of
speech. But the formation of public opinion, and the expression of ideas about
conventions, morals, art, politics, and religion play important roles in the re-
production and evolution of culture. The protection of expression is therefore
crucial to the realization of a democratic culture whatever else is also required.
Cohen’s view of selves and her idea of freedom as play are broadly consistent
with the idea that the purpose of free expression is to promote a democratic
culture. To be sure, there is more to a democratic culture than play; conversely,
there is more to Cohen’s idea of the play of everyday practice than democratic
participation in culture. Yet even if the concepts differ in important ways, there
is still considerable overlap. Play gives people a space to vary and alter culture,
and, to some extent, a say in the forms of cultural power that constitute them.
Equally important, the promotion of freedom within a democratic culture does
not presuppose the sort of fully autonomous selves that Cohen criticizes. Selves
are in conversation with others and they are always being influenced by others.
The ongoing negotiation of boundaries between self and others, and the de-
velopment of selves within evolving culture is part of the process of mutual
influence and cultural dissent, and therefore part of democratic culture.
Can we draw similar connections between freedom of speech and Cohen’s
idea of semantic discontinuity? If effective play requires semantic discontinuity,
and if the promotion of a democratic culture through free expression requires
the protection of play, then both free expression and a democratic culture
require some kinds of semantic discontinuity. But what would this mean in
practice?
First, think about limitations on intermediary liability. If the state tells inter-
mediaries that they will be held liable if they do not search for, block, and
remove illegal or tortious content, intermediaries will censor too much in order
to play it safe. This phenomenon is called ‘‘collateral censorship:’’28 the state
aims at intermediary A to get at speaker B, who may be anonymous. If A and B
are not the same entity, A has reduced incentives to protect B’s rights, and
therefore will overcensor.
28 See Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. Rev.
2043, 2095–97 (2004); J. M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. Rev. 2295, 2296–305
(1999); Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers: Identifying the ‘‘Speaker’’ Within the New
Media, 71 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 79, 116, 118 (1995).
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In contrast, safe harbor rules like section 512 of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act or intermediary immunities like Section 230 of the 1996
Telecommunications Act give intermediaries fewer incentives to block or
censor content. These rules make it more difficult to punish tortious or illegal
content, especially when the posters are anonymous. At the same time, immu-
nities and safe harbors make possible a wide range of intermediaries and plat-
forms that facilitate—or in some cases, promote—end user expression and
user-generated content.
Intermediary immunities and safe harbors create discontinuities in digital
enforcement regimes. The most efficient method for preventing dissemination
of illegal or tortious content is to place liability on the cheapest cost avoider,
who is often the intermediary. Intermediaries, for example, can install filtering
systems to block or remove illegal content; sometimes intermediaries can iden-
tify the end users who send or upload it. Safe harbors and immunities remove
intermediaries’ responsibility for the content that flows through them, thus
making it harder to enforce content controls.
At the same time, intermediary immunities show how semantic discontinuity
can benefit powerful entities even more than ordinary individuals. Section 230
of the Telecom Act also holds intermediaries harmless if they decide to block or
censor content.29 Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which
creates a safe harbor from liability, still allows YouTube to install filtering sys-
tems through deals with corporate content providers. Indeed, the real issue in
the current litigation between Viacom and YouTube30 over the correct inter-
pretation of section 512 is not whether end-users will be protected from con-
tent filtering. Rather, it is over what kinds of filters YouTube will install and
who will pay for the service.
A second important aspect of semantic discontinuity in free speech law is the
rule against prior restraints. Law students are often puzzled why the traditional
common-law principle against prior restraints protects free expression if tort
and criminal law allow for prosecution after publication. The answer is that the
rule is an ancient form of semantic discontinuity. In comparison to a system of
prior restraints, a system of subsequent punishments, even a relatively harsh
one, creates multiple gaps in enforcement of the laws that restrict speech.
A prior restraint is a licensing system, in which a censor (either the state or a
private party) decides whether speech will be permitted at all. Subsequent
punishment is a system of prosecutorial discretion, in which the state or a
29 See 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(2) (‘‘No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on
account of - (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or
make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).’’).
30 Viacom, International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F. 3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
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private plaintiff decides whether it is worth undertaking the costs of prosecu-
tion or litigation.
Systems of prior restraint create bottlenecks with fewer procedural protec-
tions. They place the burden on the speaker to gain permission, and therefore
the power of inertia rests with the censor, who may delay or simply decide
against publication as a matter of administrative convenience. Having to ask
permission alerts the censor to what is being published and establishes the idea
of censorship as a norm. Moreover, if a speaker does not seek permission or
tries to route around the system, retribution is likely because the speaker has
specifically defied the authority of the censor.31
Systems of subsequent prosecution normally offer speakers a wide range of
procedural protections, especially in criminal prosecutions. They allow publi-
cation without first seeking permission; therefore, the power of inertia rests
with the speaker, not the state. Unlike a system of prior restraints, a system
of subsequent punishments may not draw attention to the authorities about
what is to be published, or identify the speaker in advance. Punishment is also
less likely, because even if the expression is technically illegal under substantive
law, the state or private parties must still decide whether the benefits of pros-
ecution outweigh the costs.
The rule against prior restraints in the analog world is an example of seman-
tic discontinuity because the burdens of cost and inertia are placed on the side
of the speaker. Thus, a legal system that, on paper, is not very speech protect-
ive might nevertheless offer opportunities for freedom of expression in practice.
Indeed, this seems to be what happened in the colonial and revolutionary
period leading up to the ratification of the First Amendment in 1791. The
law ‘‘on the books,’’ inherited from the English common law, was decidedly
unfriendly to free speech protection; but actual practices were far more liber-
tarian.32 A combination of political culture, the jury system, and the costs of
locating and prosecuting dissenters created cultural practices of free expression
that were eventually translated into a constitutional guarantee.
The problems of prior restraint are exacerbated in a digital world. The
dream of perfect enforcement comes closer to reality. The most efficient way
of dealing with threats is ex ante, through blocking and filtering regimes, or
through denying access to key elements of the networked infrastructure.
Filtering and blocking systems operate like prior restraints because instead of
adjudicating the legality of speech after the fact, the government or
31 For the classic discussion of the problems created by licensing systems for speech, see Thomas Emerson,
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 656–60 (1955).
32 See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985) (rev. ed. of LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF
SUPPRESSION (1960)); David A. Anderson, Levy vs. Levy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 777 (1986); David M. Rabban,
The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV.
795 (1985); David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983).
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intermediaries—or the two acting in concert—simply prevent it from flowing
through digital networks. Permission to speak is granted or denied automatic-
ally, without human intervention. The criteria for blocking and filtering—or
even the fact of filtering—may be hidden from end users, violating Cohen’s
goal of operational transparency.
Blocking and filtering regimes literally frustrate access to knowledge. Many
of the problems of analog systems of prior restraint are amplified. The burdens
of cost and inertia favor the censor, who need only change a few lines of code
or flip a switch to block expression.
In a digital world that may not respect borders and is filled with anonymous
actors, governments may find it better to nip problems in the bud rather than
to try to locate and prosecute people after harm has occurred. And to nip
problems in the bud, it is easiest to control the infrastructure. To this end,
governments can aim at many different points of control: telecommunications
companies, Internet service providers, search engines, online service providers
and platform operators, domain name registrars and registries, and even sup-
port systems like web hosting services, advertisers, and financial payment
systems.
Cohen’s idea of semantic discontinuity is useful precisely because govern-
ment and industry are increasingly adopting strategies of surveillance, filtering,
and ex ante prevention. Governments increasingly seek to exploit points of
control in the information infrastructure to achieve their policy goals.
Cohen’s book serves as an important reminder that the quest for perfect sys-
tems of enforcement can have consequences that are quite imperfect, especially
where issues of cultural freedom—and, I would add, freedom of expression—
are at stake.
Conclusion: semantic discontinuity for me but
not for thee
Many of the issues of privacy and intellectual property that Cohen is concerned
with in her book may be recast as issues of national security, terrorism, or
crime prevention. This is perhaps the greatest difficulty for her approach.
Once an issue is successfully characterized in public debates as a matter of
national security, calls for imperfect, gap-filled systems may seem unrealistic
and counterproductive. Governments face shadowy threats from overseas and
can ill afford leaky systems of surveillance and enforcement. Not surprisingly,
both governments and businesses that seek to protect intellectual property
rights and rights of data collection have incentives to describe problems of
governance in precisely these ways. What Cohen celebrates as semantic discon-
tinuity they will see as imperfection and an obstacle to effective law enforce-
ment rather than a strategy for protecting human flourishing.
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Nevertheless, at the same time, these governments and businesses will want
to maintain their own form of semantic discontinuity. They will want to
preserve for themselves plenty of room for maneuver and avoid surveillance of
their own operations, while reducing or eliminating semantic discontinuity that
benefits ordinary individuals. Indeed, this seems to be the general direction of
digital enforcement—toward the construction of a great two-way mirror in
which ordinary people’s lives are increasingly transparent to powerful public
and private entities that are not transparent to the people they view. Whether
these developments are inevitable, or whether there is another, more demo-
cratic future available to us, is the great question for information policy in the
digital age.
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